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1. INTRODUCTION
According to the World Bank (2014)1, “there should be a strong relation-
ship between remittance flows and financial inclusion. A key reason is 
that remittances are usually regular and predict able flows, which should, 
in principle, make remittance recipients relatively more inclined to join 
the formal financial sector”.
It has been claimed also that remittances represent the most important 
financial transactions for people with limited access to banking services. 
These claims are based on two stylized facts observed in many developing 
countries, namely relatively low access to banking services, and relatively 
high levels of remittance flows.
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In 2014, more than 2.5 billion people lacked a bank account, with the bank-
ing service penetration rates observed in developing countries.2 This num-
ber decreased by 20% between 2011 and 2014 (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 
Singer, Van Oudheusden, 2014), despite multiple costs incurred by open-
ing and holding a bank account: transport costs (e.g. in countries with poor 
infrastructure), administrative costs (i.e. the level of paperwork especially 
in countries with low levels of literacy); and service costs (charges asso-
ciated with regular or exceptional banking operations). The poor devel-
opment of banking services is due to demand-side factors such as lack of 
users’ skills, and users’ attitudes and behaviors. It is due also to supply-side 
factors such as the high barriers to entry and low profitability associated 
with setting up a dense network of bank subsidiaries in rural and sparsely 
populated areas.
In such context, the diffusion of mobile payment or M-payment services 
(further M-payment) has been promoted to overcome some of these chal-
lenges. M-payments are payments for goods, services, bills and invoices 
via a mobile device, such as a mobile phone, smart-phone, or PDA (per-
sonal digital assistant), exploiting mobile telecommunications networks or 
close technologies (Dahlberg et al., 2008). The M-pesa experience in Kenya 
is often cited as an example of the successful diffusion of M-payment (Jack 
and Suri, 2011). The M-pesa service was launched in 2007 by the opera-
tor Safaricom. It allows M-transfers, M-payments (e.g., airtime purchase, 
mobile ticketing, bulk payments) and M-banking services (e.g., micro-sav-
ings, Automated Teller Machine withdrawals). It is used by more than 
70% of Kenyan adults (Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2011) and by 50% of poor, 
unbanked and rural populations (Alexander, 2010).
According to the World Bank’s Global Findex Index (Demigurc-Kunt et al., 
2014), in “Sub-Saharan Africa, [...] mobile money accounts drove the 
growth in overall account penetration from 24 percent in 2011 to 34 per-
cent in 2014” (Demigurc-Kunt et al., 2014, p. 13). The same Word Bank 
report points out that in this region, between 2011 and 2014, more than 
10% of the population chose to open a mobile money account managed by 
a non financial institution either alone or in collaboration with a finan-
cial institution. In these countries, mobile money could be a key driver of 
the observed growing financial inclusion.
2 Data available at http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of mobile services is particu-
larly widespread in countries that are characterized by low levels of bank-
ing facilities. The intuition is that M-payment services alleviate both sup-
ply and demand constraints. On the one hand, the equipment required 
by users to implement M-payment exchanges is minimal for users since 
most people are equipped with mobile phones and are familiar with their 
use. Sometimes described as a “frugal innovation” (see Bhatti et al. 2013), 
this feature of M-payment services lowers user adoption costs. On the 
other hand, the technologies used to implement M-payment rest on wire-
less communication networks and exhibit strong characteristics of ubiq-
uity. From a supply-side perspective, this reduces the geographical con-
straints especially since the network investment required to supply mobile 
telecommunication services and M-payment services are complementary 
service.
The second stylized fact in many developing countries refers to the role 
played by remittance flows for domestic economies. In October 2015, the 
World Bank counted 579,809 million remittance flows worldwide (with an 
annual 4% increase).3 According to the World Bank Group Factbook (2016), 
between 2006 and 2014 remittance flows to developing countries increased 
by 77.7%.4 232 million people (3.2% of the world’s population) live and work 
outside their home countries and the number of international remittances 
in 2014 reached 528 billion, of which 72% (378 billion) went to low and mid-
dle income countries (World Bank Group, 2016).
Remittance flows are generated mainly by high migration, satisfy several 
economic objectives (consumption, investment, insurance), and can have 
diverse economic impacts on home countries (Martinez, Cumming, and 
Vaaler, 2015). On the basis of these trends, the World Bank suggests the 
existence of a positive relationship between remittance flows and finan-
cial inclusion on the one hand, and between M-payment use and financial 
inclusion on the other. However, to the best of our knowledge, no theoret-
ical analysis has attempted to delve deeper into this general claim. At the 
3 Sources: October and April 2015 versions of World Bank Bilateral Remittance 
Estimates for 2013 using Migrant Stocks, Host Country Incomes, and Origin Country 
Incomes.
4 http://siteresources.worldbank.org /INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934- 
1199807908806/4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf
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macroeconomic level, it has been argued that the increase in remittance 
incomes might be explained by the reduced transaction costs caused by 
technological improvements (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). However, 
the theoretical literature makes no explicit link between M-payment use 
for internal transactions and that of remittance flows. This paper tries to 
fill this gap by elaborating two original features.
First, we focus on the use and impact of M-payment for consumption pur-
poses. We consider the introduction of an M-payment service to achieve 
within-country, distant person-to-person transactions. We hypothesize 
that the introduction of M-payment generates new consumption oppor-
tunities for the remittance receiver in the home country. Previous work 
(Aker and Mbitti, 2010, Jack and Suri 2011, Aker et al., 2014, Flood et alli, 
2013) shows that the use of M-payment services reduces spatial constraints 
by enabling distant payments which in turn, generates new consumption 
and investment opportunities. Prior to the introduction of M-payment, 
such trades were possible but were limited in scope due to their high inter-
mediation costs and poorly developed banking sectors. Thus, the ubiquity 
of M-payment services reduces geographical constraints by allowing more 
secure and efficient financial exchanges.
Second, we propose an integrated framework which endogenizes the 
remittance decision of the remitter located outside the home country. In 
our model, remittances are used for consumption, from which the remit-
tance receivers derive utility. We assume also that the decision to send a 
remittance to a domestic household is altruistic: the remittance sender 
takes into account in his/her utility the utility gained by the remittance 
receiver when he/she uses the remittance.
These two features are introduced in a two-step game in which first 
migrant agents decide on the level of the remittance sent to the domes-
tic agents, and second, the domestic agents decide to spend this remit-
tance using M-payment or cash. We confirm theoretically the empirical 
microeconomic findings in Munyegera and Matsumoto (2016) which find 
a positive effect of mobile payment on household welfare and explain 
that domestic agents receive remittances more frequently withe a total 
value higher than that of non-user agents. We also find two sets of macro-
economic results. First, we show that introducing M-payment has a posi-
tive effect on aggregate remittance flows, and on welfare. We observe no 
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crowding out effects in the form of lower levels of remittances due to their 
improved use allowed by M-payment. Second, we analyze the role of two 
key parameters (cost of use of cash, cost of M-payment services) on the 
outcome with M-payment. The cash cost-of-use has expected impacts in 
terms of diffusion of M-payment and welfare. However, the impact of the 
M-payment services cost is ambiguous. We find that an increase in their 
price has two opposite effects. First, it lowers the equilibrium adoption 
rate of M-payment; second, individual remittances sent by migrant agents 
increase, providing a kind of “compensation” effect.
Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the theo-
retical framework, and section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Our research topic is related to two bodies of literature dedicated respec-
tively to remittances and M-payment. The economic literature on remit-
tances analyzes both the motives for sending a remittance, and the 
economic impact of remittances. First, the motivations for sending remit-
tances can be diverse (Yang, 2011). Lucas and Stark’s (1985) seminal study 
indicates that these motivations range from altruism to self interest with 
various mixes of the two motivations also possible. Frequently, migrant 
agents send money home to increase the quality of life of their origin 
families (Al Mamun et al., 2015). They “derive a positive utility from the 
well-being or consumption level of the famil[ies] left behind” (Piracha and 
Saraogi, 2011). In this paper, we focus on this motive but other motives 
have also been considered. For instance, Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) add 
an insurance motive: for the domestic family the remittance becomes an 
insurance tool to protect against income shocks by diversifying its sources 
of income (Yang and Choi, 2007). In other cases, remittances are used to 
invest in the home country: the migrant agent and his/her family can use 
them to accumulate savings, or to acquire financial or more frequently, 
physical assets (Bounie, Diminescu, Francis, 2013). In this case, it is more 
difficult to distinguish altruism from self interest in the migrant agent.
There is also a stream of literature on the economic effects of remit-
tances (Chami et al., 2008a, Guha, 2013) positioning the macroeconomic 
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relationship between remittances and economic growth as central 
(Goschin, 2014, Jouini, 2015). In most cases, remittances are shown to pro-
mote economic growth (Chami et al., 2008b). According to Yaseen (2012), 
remittances impact on growth through two channels: financial develop-
ment, and institutions. The remittances received relieve credit and insur-
ance constraints and increase household income (Atamanov, Van Den Berg, 
2012). Remittances contribute to financial development which may inter-
act with growth (Gupta, et al., 2009, Le, 2011, Imaia, Gaihab, Alia, Kaicker, 
2014, Kumar, 2013). According to Ziesemer (2012), remittances have a pos-
itive effect not only on the level and growth of per capita GDP but also 
on savings rates and public expenditure on education, while decreasing 
tax revenues and emigration. However, this positive effect on growth has 
been disputed (Jouini, 2015). For instance, Chami et al. (2008a) find a sig-
nificant negative influence on economic growth, reasoning that remit-
tances might allow domestic families to remain inactive which would slow 
the development of human capital in the home country. Remittances also 
accelerate financial inclusion (Anzoategui et al., 2014) and have a positive 
effect – at least in the short term – on both poverty and financial devel-
opment (Gupta et al., 2009).
The second body of literature refers to the economics of mobile money 
that include both issues in monetary economics and industrial organi-
zation. From a theoretical perspective, it makes reference to the litera-
ture dealing with the choice between cash and other types of assets with-
out supposing any cash-in-advanced constraint (Whitesell, 1989, Arango, 
Bouhdaoui, Bounie, Eschelbach and Hernandez 2016, Alvarez and Lippi, 
2015). An original feature of the choice of mobile money against other 
means of payment is that, like the type of money use in search based mod-
els, M-payment can only be used if both partners agree on acceptance and 
use of it. Put differently, as the use of M-payment is not generalized, the 
choice to adopt it is then mainly determined by the choice of other agents 
to use it.
The diffusion of mobile money has likely enabled millions of people who 
otherwise would have been excluded from the formal financial system, to 
perform financial transactions. In countries with low levels of penetra-
tion of banking facilities, M-payment can compensate partially by provid-
ing secure, simple, and rapid banking services (Chaix, Torre, 2015). It has 
been documented that the banking industry faces huge difficulties when 
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expanding to developing countries with largely unbanked rural popula-
tions (Assadi, Cudi, 2011). In those countries, development of a retail net-
work (subsidiaries, money transport) entails high fixed costs which can 
deter entry to some areas (De Sousa, 2010). Mobile telecommunication 
networks provide an alternative and cheaper way to implement banking 
transactions (Granata et al., 2014). To enhance success, governments and 
policy need to introduce light regulation to increase the supply of mobile 
money, while also imposing rules enforcing a certain level of interopera-
bility (Evans, Pirchio, 2015, Ky, 2015).
To our knowledge, the only paper which considers both remittances and 
M-payment is Munyegera and Matsumoto (2016). They propose an empir-
ical analysis of the effects of use of mobile money services on household 
welfare in developing countries. They use household survey panel data 
from rural Uganda for the 2009-2014 period. They apply a combination 
of household fixed effects, instrumental variables, and propensity score 
matching methods. They find a positive and significant effect of access to 
mobile money on household welfare, as measured by real per capita con-
sumption. The mechanism driving this impact is the facilitation of remit-
tance: households using mobile money services are more likely to receive 
remittances, to receive more frequent remittances, and to receive higher 
value remittances than non-user households do.
Our paper contributes to this body of work by considering the interplay 
between remittances and use of new payment services in the receiver 
country, an issue which so far has not been studied theoretically. In our 
framework, the level of the individual remittance depends on the subse-
quent consumption opportunities which in turn, are influenced by the 
available payment technology. Among the various motivations for send-
ing a remittance, we focus on the role of altruism since this appears to be 
a central motivation if the remittance is used for consumption. We con-
tribute also to the literature on adoption of M-payment: our model cap-
tures, in a simple way, the change in consumption decisions enabled by 
M-payment technology, and analyze how the use of M-payment can drive 
the switch from trades implemented at the local scale to trades imple-
mented on a wider scale. Another original feature of our model is that we 
consider the decisions of both remitters and receivers, and evaluate the 
welfare of remitters’/receivers’ families in this context, prior to and after 
the introduction of M-payments.
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3. THE THEORETICAL SETTING
To analyze the impact of M-payment use on the remittance and consump-
tion decisions, we build an original framework which accounts for both 
the remittance decision and the use of the remittance for consumption, 
with M-payment or with traditional exchange means (i.e. cash).
We consider the choices made by n households. Each household i is com-
posed of domestic agents i.e., family/relatives located in the domestic coun-
try (referred to as domestic agents) and of migrant agents i.e., the net-
work of family/relatives living outside the country (referred to as migrant 
agents). Migrant (resp. domestic) agents are remitters (resp. receivers).
In a first step, the migrant agents of household i i n( )= ...1  send a remit-
tance r ri i( )≥ 0  to domestic agents i. In a second step, the domestic agents 
i of household i receive this remittance and face various consumption 
opportunities depending on use of M-payment.5 This defines a two step 
game which is solved by backward induction.6
3.1. Step 2 (domestic agents) : M-payment use  
and consumption opportunities
3.1.1. Consumption opportunities
At step 2, the domestic agents i receive a remittance r ri i( )≥ 0  and face two 
potential consumption opportunities.7 Domestic agents i can consume 
goods bought either distantly or locally. Distant consumption opportuni-
ties relate to all transactions that cannot be implemented without a previ-
5 Note that we here focus on internal uses of M-payment. Thus, we do not consider 
here the channel through which the remittance is sent (see e.g. Kosse and Vermeulen 
(2014) and Siegel and Lücke (2013) on this issue)
6 A practical implication of the structure of the game is that migrant agents are aware 
of the subsequent level of the domestic agents’ utilily enabled by their remittances. 
This can be done either informally or by use of communication devices that allows 
for information exchange. 
7 Since the model focuses on the interplay between M-payment use and remittances, 
we do not need to consider other sources of revenue for domestic households.
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ous physical cash transfer. For instance, consider a person-to-person 
trade. If this trade is local (e.g., the two persons live in the same geograph-
ical area and there are no transportation costs stricto sensu), the transac-
tion and the payment are simultaneous, and cash is sufficient. However, 
if these two persons are physically distant, there is a need to secure the 
transaction before the good is produced or exchanged, and use of cash 
might inhibit such transactions.8 The transaction costs are usually so high 
as to discourage cash transactions in such cases.
For simplicity, we assume linear preferences: for each unit of expense, 
domestic households obtain a utility level kl (resp.  kd ) from consump-
tion of goods bought locally (resp. distantly). Starting from a situation in 
which exchanges essentially are local because of lack of payment means to 
achieve distant trade, goods bought distantly are a way for households to 
diversify their consumption set compared to a locally-constrained basket 
set. Thus, we assume k kd l> .
3.1.2. Payment systems
Domestic agents can use two alternative payment systems. The traditional 
payment system (cash, denoted C) is subject to payment of a per transac-
tion cost (denoted t t, < <0 1).
When receiving a remittance ri, domestic agents using cash obtain r ti ( )1−  
from this remittance. Using cash provides access only to local exchanges. 
Thus, domestic agents that receive ri, derive utility uC i,  from use of cash:
 u k r tC i l i, = −( )1  (1)
The mobile payment system (denoted M) is proposed by a mobile operator. 
In accordance with the practices common to many countries, this opera-
tor supplies the payment system with a flat rate subscription scheme p9 
8 For the sake of simplicity, and as remittances mainly concern low revenue receivers, 
we exclude the possibility of distant B2C payments online using or mobile technolo-
gies via Paypal or equivalent payment services.
9 This is for instance the pricing model actually used in Tanzania, (see e.g. Jang and 
Park 2016). Other countries often associate an entry cost (in our model, qualitatively 
similar to a flat rate in our model) and some proportional fees. If there is a positive 
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Hence, domestic agents receiving ri and using the M-payment system even-
tually obtain (r pi − ).
Using the mobile payment system provides access to both distant and local 
consumption opportunities while cash provides access only to local con-
sumption opportunities through local exchanges. Thus, when using the 
M-payment system, domestic agents obtain the utility level in Equation 2:
 u r p k m
n
k t m


















( ) ( )1 1  (2)
In equation (2), me is the expected number of domestic agents using 
M-payment and m ne /  is the overall adoption rate of M-payment among 
the whole population of domestic agents. The first term captures the utility 
derived from distant exchanges. Consider a person-to-person exchanges. 
Each of these distant exchanges provides utility kd . However, implementa-
tion of an exchange is conditional on other trader adopting the M-payment 
service. We account for that by considering that implementation of a dis-
tant exchange depends on the expected M-payment adoption rate mn
e( ). 
This generates a network externality for M-payment use which we assume 
to be linear. This externality does not apply to cash since by definition, 
all agents accept cash. Other exchanges (1− ( )mne ) are implemented locally 
and each provides utility kl. Last, because of the flat rate nature of the 
transaction cost incurred when using M-Payment, the available purchas-
ing power is given by ( )r pi −  as M-payment is used, even for a small pro-
portion of transactions. This explains that the whole parenthesis is multi-
plied by ( )r pi −  in equation (2).
At step 2, domestic agents i need to choose among exclusive use of cash (C) 
or mixed use of M-payment (M) and cash in order to maximize utility and 
obtain u u ui M i C i
∗
, ,{ }= ,max . To differentiate from those agents that only use 
cash, we denote those agents that use cash and M-payment as M-payment 
users by convenience. However, in accordance with actual payment sys-
tems, recall that those users always use both payment exchange systems 
since M-payment cannot substitute for all possible transactions.
fixed fee and if the proportional fee is sufficiently low, introducing a proportional 
fee would not change the results qualitatively. Thus, we do not integrate these costs 
explicitly.
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3.2. Step 1 (migrant agents) : remittance decision
Migrant agents i, ( )i n= ,....1  are endowed with a revenue wi  derived from 
their own production activities (e.g., wages). Because these activities poten-
tially originate from various countries and various sectors, it is essential 
to consider some heterogeneity among migrant agents. This revenue is 
used for distribution to the domestic household ri and for personal con-
sumption ci. The preferences of the migrant agent i can be depicted by an 
indirect utility function which includes both a personal and an “altruis-
tic” components. We consider the simplest form of this function in equa-
tion (3).
 U u u w ri M i C i i i= , −, ,{ } ( )max a  (3)
The first term depicts the utility from distribution to the domestic house-
hold. The second term depicts the utility from the migrant agents’ own 
consumption. Thus, parameter α (α > 0) is an inverse measure of the 
migrant agents’ propensity for altruism.
At step 1, the objective of the migrant agent is to maximize (3) with 
respect to ri. To do this, we make two technical assumptions. First, we 
assume perfect a fit between the preferences of the domestic agents and 
those of the migrant agent i.e., there is no difference between the percep-
tions of the utility of domestic agents by migrant agents (equation (3)) and 
the domestic agents’ actual utility (equations (1) and (2)). Second, we con-
sider an equilibrium with perfect expectations in the sense that the actual 
number of receivers adopting m-payment is equal to the expected number 
(m me = ∗).10
3.3. Benchmark
To analyze the economic impacts of the introduction of M-payment, we 
define the benchmark as the situation prior to its introduction. Thus, in 
10 This assumption is quite reasonable since we focus here on long term outcomes. 
However, actual adoption rates during the adoption process of M-payment is not 
always public knowledge. Analysis of medium-run outcomes would require a specific 
dynamical setting.
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the benchmark case, domestic agents can only use cash and are restricted 
to local exchanges.
Lemma 1. At  step  2  of  the  benchmark  case,  all  domestic  agents  use  cash  and 
m∗ = 0. At  Step 1  of  the  benchmark  case,  the  equilibrium  individual  remittance  is 
r wi B i,
∗ = / +( )1 a  and total equilibrium remittance flows amount to RB
n w w w w∗ − +
+=
( )( )
( )2 1 a .
Proof. See Appendix 
As stated in Lemma 1, an increase in wi  influences the level of individual 
remittance positively. This is true also at the aggregate level: an increase 
in the upper bound of the revenue distribution (w) influences total remit-
tances positively. Note however, that an increase in the cost of using the 
cash system (t) has no direct impact on individual (and thus total) remit-
tances but has a negative impact on domestic and migrant agents’ sur-
pluses. Finally, note that an increase in a  (i.e. less altruistic migrant 
agents) has a negative impact on the individual and aggregate levels of 
remittances.
From the equilibrium remittance values, we deduce the aggregate surplus 
of domestic and migrant agents.
Lemma 2. In the benchmark case, the equilibrium surplus of domestic agents (DoS) 
amounts to DoSb
k n t w w w wl∗ − − +
+






k n t w wl w
w
∗















a a . Total  equilibrium  welfare  amounts  to 
W DoS MiSb b b
∗ ∗ ∗= + .
Proof. See Appendix 
Then these values are compared to those in the equilibrium with 
M-payment.
4. RESULTS
Section 4.1 characterizes the equilibrium outcome with M-payment adop-
tion and uses comparative statics to analyze the impact of key parameters. 
M-payMent use and reMittances in developing countries: a theoretical analysis
R E V U E D ’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 15 6  ➻  4 E T R IME S T R E 2 016 171
Section 4.2 compares the two equilibrium outcomes to derive the impact of 
M-payment introduction on aggregate economic variables.
4.1. Equilibrium outcome with M-payment
We focus here on interior outcomes i.e., outcomes where some domestic 
agents use only cash and others make use of M-payment. A sufficient 
condition for this type of outcome to occur is that the price of access to 
M-payment services is not too high ( )p p<  .11 By convenience, we drop 
the ‘M’ subscript defining the equilibrium values at equilibrium with 
M-payment.
Lemma 3. In  the  equilibrium  with  M-payment,  domestic  agents  that  receive 
r ri c,
∗ <  use cash only (see definition of  r  in Appendix). Those that receive r ri m,
∗ >   use 
M-payment. The individual remittance sent to cash users amounts to r wi c i,









Lemma 3 defines the minimal individual remittance level ( r ) required 
for the domestic agents to adopt M-payment at step 2 at equilibrium. From 
this definition, we can compute the equilibrium with M-payment and 
derive the following propositions.
Proposition 1. In the equilibrium with M-payment, the proportion of M-payment 
services users is m n r r w w∗ / = − / −( ) ( ) . The number of M-payment users increases 
with t and kd  and decreases with p and kl.
Proof. See Appendix 
As stated in Lemma 3, the domestic agents that use cash only are those 
that receive lower amounts of remittances. For those agents, the level of 
remittances sent is the same as that in the benchmark case. Those domes-
tic agents that receive higher levels of remittances use M-payment. In 
doing so, these agents receive a higher individual remittance at equilib-




11 See Appendix for the definition of p .
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Simple comparative statics provide insights on the impact of the cost of 
using cash t: as previously, an increase in t has no direct impact on the 
remittance sent to cash users. However, this increase generates some sub-
stitution effects: as stated in Proposition 1, because of this increase, some 
agents switch to use of M-payment. While the level of remittances received 
when using M-payment is independent of t, those agents that switch to 
M-payment benefit indirectly from this increase in t because they receive 




The effects of the price of the M-payment service p provide some inter-
esting results. On the one hand, an increase in p is found to deter some 
domestic agents from using M-payment (proposition 1). This can be inter-
preted as a classical substitution effect since it is similar to an increase in 
the relative cost of M-payment vs. cash. However, the same increase in p 
generates a “compensation” effect at step 1 since for those domestic agents 
who continue using M-payment, an increase in p generates a higher level 
of individual remittance sent by migrant agents (proposition 1). This effect 
is based on the combination of the flat rate nature of the price access to 
M-payment and of the altruism of migrant agents towards domestic ones. 
Note however, that as p increases this compensation effect applies to a 
decreasing number of domestic agents.
Proposition 2. In  the  equilibrium with M-payment, aggregate  equilibrium remit-
tance flows received by cash users Rc
∗ decrease with t and kd  and increase with p and 
kl. The aggregate remittance flows received by M-payment users Rm
∗  increase with t 
and kd  and decrease with kl. The effect of p on Rm
∗  is ambiguous. Total remittance 
flows amounts to R R Rc m
∗ ∗ ∗= + . It increases with t and kd  and decreases with kl.
Proof. See Appendix 
The effects of p and t on the individual remittance have an impact also on 
aggregate remittances as shown by Proposition 2. An increase in the cost 
of using cash generates unambiguous impacts : this increase has a nega-
tive impact on those domestic agents that only use cash because they bene-
fit from identical levels of individual remittances but both the number of 
cash users and the utility of cash users decrease. However, as t increases, 
M-payment users benefit from identical levels of individual remittances 
while the number of such users increases. Also, given the higher network 
externality generated by more numerous M-payment users, the utility 
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level of these users also increases. This change in the distribution of cash 
vs. M-payment users increases remittances as t increases, since use of 
remittances now becomes more “efficient”.
The price of M-payment services generates more ambiguous impacts. Similar 
to the reasoning above, although an increase in p has no impact on the indi-
vidual remittances sent to cash users, it generates an increase in the num-
ber of cash users. This generates in turn an increase in the total remittance 
flows received by cash users. In the case of M-payment users, an increase 
in p has ambiguous effects on the total remittance flows received by 
M-payment: on the one hand, it decreases the number of M-payment users; 
on the other hand, it increases the level of the individual remittances sent 
to these users. The overall effect of these two effects combined is ambigu-
ous. Specifically, the aggregate effect depends on a complex set of parame-
ters (namely k k tl d, ,  and a) among which it is difficult to identify the role 
played by certain factors. Since aggregate remittance flows are composed of 
two flows as described above, the same ambiguity arises when considering 
the impact of the price of M-payment services on total remittance flows.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium with M-payment, the aggregate surplus of cash 
users increases with p and kl and decreases with t and kd . The aggregate surplus of 
M-payment users increases with kd .
Proof. See Appendix 
In the case of propositions 1 and 2, the impacts of p and t on the aggregate 
surplus of cash users are mostly as expected: since a higher t (or lower p) 
deters some domestic agents from using cash, and since those agents bene-
fit from higher individual remittances, the aggregate surplus of cash users 
decreases. However, the effect of other variables (p, kl and t) on the aggre-
gate surplus of M-payment user is ambiguous. Consider an increase in p: 
as previously stated, this has two opposite effect (lower adoption rate of 
M-payment, higher individual remittances). So, the overall effect cannot 
be determined.
4.2. Effects of M-payment introduction
To formally evaluate the macro-impact of the introduction of M-payment, 
propositions 4 and 5 refer to comparison of the equilibrium macroeconomic 
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variables in the benchmark case (i.e., prior to M-payment introduction) as 
stated in lemmas 1 and 2, to the macroeconomic variables defined in the 




Proposition 4 highlights the macroeconomic positive effect of using 
M-payment for internal exchanges on remittance flows. For a develop-
ing country, this provides some rationale for promoting use of M-payment 
in order to attract larger amounts of remittances. Note however, that 
other effects might prevail at the micro- and macro-economic levels. 
One of these can be described as a “crowding out effect”: because use of 
M-payment generates new and more favorable consumption opportunities 
for domestic agents, remitters could decide to decease remittances once 
M-payment is introduced. This effect is not generated in our model and it 
is interesting to stress that this is independent of the level of altruism of 
migrant agents (measured inversely by a). Second, note that the result of 
Proposition 4 holds for non-use of M-payment services for the transfer of 
remittances from emitters to receivers (“remittance channel”). As previ-
ously stated, in some countries, M-payment services can be used also for 
transferring cash across countries (i.e. as a remittance channel). It might 
be expected from that the general results raised by Propositions 4 would 
be reinforced by the introduction of M-payment as an international trans-
fer service. However, to confirm this would require precise knowledge 
about the implementation of an international transfer service (e.g., price 






According to proposition 5, the surplus of domestic agents always increases 
with the introduction of M-payment. There are two explanations for 
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this result. First, M-payments enable exchanges that generate higher 
utility. Then, with identical remittance levels, those agents that adopt 
M-payments benefit from a higher level of surplus. However, crowding 
out effects might produce the opposite result. Proposition 4 predicts that 
individual remittances levels are always higher after the introduction 
of M-payment ; we do not observe any crowding out effects here, mean-
ing that the two effects are reinforcing. In turn, this supports proposi-
tion 4 on the benefits to a developing country in promoting the diffusion 
of M-payment services. This holds also for ‘welfare’ defined as the sum of 
the surplus of domestic and migrant agents. However, note that this is a 
domestic and not a global measure of welfare since it does not account for 
losses in terms of revenue/consumption incurred by the host country of 
the migrant agents when those agents increase their remittance flows.
An obvious corollary of propositions 4 and 5 is that the introduction of 
M-payment alters the “geography of trade” in the domestic country by 
increasing trade between distant areas relative to trade within a given 
area. In our model, this result is induced by the fact that cash can be used 
only for local trades while M-payment is ubiquitous.
However, it is clear that some developing countries have developed other 
means to exchange money across two distant areas (e.g., through a frag-
mented banking system, or networks of physical intermediaries) so there 
are other channels allowing for distant trading. In this case, our model 
provides a rough simplification of actual practices; the introduction of 
such alternative would not qualitatively change the results tough since a 
widespread use of M-payment would stimulate trade across areas because 
of the ubiquitous nature of M-payment.
5. CONCLUSION
The model provides other interesting findings on the role played by the 
price of the M-payment service and the cost of using cash. A decrease in 
the cash cost-of-use (caused by e.g., public investments in physical secu-
rity, and in the road or financial infrastructures) might increase the use 
of cash and deter use of M-payment. However, the overall effect on aggre-
gate remittances would be negative. In addition, the effect of a decrease 
in the price of M-payment services cannot be determined unambiguously. 
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While intuitively we would suggest that such a decrease would be posi-
tive for the economy, our model shows that this effect is not easily pre-
dictable since it induces more domestic agents to switch to M-payment use 
while at the same time, lowering the level of individual remittances sent 
by migrant agents.
Our framework is designed to apply to consumption decisions. To what 
extent the model can be applied to remittances for production motives 
remains an open question whose resolution would require deeper knowl-
edge about the motives for sending remittances for other purposes such as 
e.g. investment, and the possible uses of remittances for these purposes. 
Also, this paper focused on the adoption of M-payment services for inter-
nal uses. Anecdotal evidence suggests that diffusion of M-payment services 
might be clustered geographically and this effect could be enhanced by 
cross-border operators, or by interoperability strategies adopted by opera-
tors in neighbor countries. This suggests that M-payment services could be 
used by remitters/receivers of remittances for international trades (Della 
Peruta, 2015). There is a need for a more complete empirical identification 
of these practices, and if they are confirmed, a precise analysis of their 
economic implications. This points to directions for future research.
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APPENDIX
Benchmark equilibrium: proofs of lemmas 1 and 2
Proof of lemma 1
Consider first the case of a domestic agent i. In the benchmark equilibrium, 
only use of cash is possible and agent i obtains the utility level defined by 
equation (1). Since uC i, > 0 for all possible parameter sets, the participa-
tion constraint of domestic agents for step 2 is always fulfilled, and in the 
benchmark equilibrium, all agents receive utility u u k r ti C i l i= = −, ( )1 . At 
step 1, knowing that domestic agents only use cash, migrant agents maxi-
mize U u w ri C i i i= −, ( )a  w.r.t. ri for any w w wi ∈ ,( ). From FOC, we derive that 
r w ri i i c
∗
,
∗= / + ≡( )1 a . It can be easily checked that since a > 0, this opti-
mum is always interior (i.e., w r wi< <
∗ ) and SOC are always filled. That 
proves Lemma 1.
Proof of lemma 2
Since optimal remittance ri c,
∗  is a strictly increasing function of wi, this 
defines the remittance distribution as a uniform distribution over the 
interval ( ) ( ( ) ( ))r r w w, ≡ / + , / +1 1a a . Aggregate remittance flows in 
the benchmark equilibrium are defined as R n r dwiB w
w
i
n w w w w∗ ∗ − +
+= =∫ ( )( )( )2 1 a . 
The domestic agents’ surplus at the benchmark equilibrium (DOSb
∗) 
amounts to DOS n u r drib r
r
i
k n t w w w wl∗ ∗ − − +
+
= =∫ ( ) ( )( )( )( )1 2 1 2a . The migrant 
agents’ surplus at the benchmark equilibrium (MiSb
∗) amounts to 
MiS n U r dwib w
w
i
k n t w wl w
w
∗ ∗

















a a)( )2+ . The total surplus at the bench-
mark equilibrium amounts to W DOS MiSb b b
∗ ∗ ∗= + . That proves Lemma 2.
Equilibrium outcome with M-payment:  
proofs of lemma 3, propositions 1, 2, and 3
Proof of lemma 3
Consider an equilibrium outcome with uses of both M and C at step 2. 
Consider first the case of domestic agents i at step 2. Those agents have 
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to decide between use of C or M in order to maximize their indirect util-
ity. Comparing (2) and (1), it can be observed that the domestic agents that 
will use C are characterized by the lower levels of individual remittances. 
Thus, the decision about M vs. C depends on the individual remittance ri 
received at step 1. If r  is the minimal remittance level for M-payment use, 
r  corresponds to the remittances of a domestic agent indifferent at step 2 
about use of C or use of M. r  is such that if the domestic agent i receives 
r , u uC i M i, ,= . For those domestic users that choose cash at step 2, optimal 
remittance decision ri C,
∗  at Step 1 is the same as that in the benchmark case 
(i.e., r wi c i,
∗ = / +( )1 a , by derivation of U u w ri C i i i= −, ( )a  w.r.t. ri). For those 
domestic users that choose M at step 2, the migrant agents need to max-
imize U u w ri M i i i= −, ( )a  according to equation (3) w.r.t. ri. From FOC, we 
can deduce the optimal level of remittances r w pi m i,
∗ = + / +( ) ( )a a1  sent by 
migrants agents to domestic agents that use M. Note that the condition for 
an interior outcome solution is that 0 < <,
∗r wi m i . The positivity condition 
is always fulfilled, and r wi m i,
∗ <  is equivalent to p wi< . Computation of SOC 
comes to the same condition p wi< . Hence, it is necessary for the price of 
M-payment to be small enough for this interior outcome to occur. Assuming 
that p w<  this is sufficient for all user potentially to adopt M-payment. A 
less strong assumption would be that only those agents that actually use 
M-payment fulfill this condition. This must be true for the domestic agents 
that adopt M-payment and receive the lowest individual remittance ( r ). 
These domestic agents correspond migrant agents endowed with w (see below 
for the definition of r  at equilibrium). Hence, we need to check p w p< ≡% $  
with p k w k t w w w wk k td ld l =
− − + + − + + − +
− + − + − +
1
2
2 1 1 3
2 1 1(
( ) ( )( )
( ( )( )
a a a
a ) ( (( ( )( )) ))a a a+ √ − + − + − +1 2 1 1
2 2k k td l  
( )( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (( )1 4 1 4 1 12 2 2 2+ + + − + + + − + − + +a a a ak w k k t w w w w w k t w wd d l l
2
2 26+ − +( ) )))).w ww w a
Inside the range of definition, individual optimal remittance levels ri m,
∗  
and ri c,
∗  are both increasing functions of wi. So lower (resp. higher) income 
levels are associated with lower (resp. higher) remittance levels allowing 
use of C (resp. M). From that, we can deduce the lower (r ) and upper (r ) 
bounds of the remittance distribution at an equilibrium with M-payment: 
r w= / +( )1 a  and r w p= + / +( ) ( )a a1 .
For an outcome with both M and C occurring at step 2, we thus need r r r< < . 
By definition, the mass of M-payment users amounts to  m n r rr r=
−
−( ) and we 
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can replace r  and r  by their values hence  m n r w p w= + / + −( ( )) ( )1 a a . 
In an equilibrium with perfect expectations, agents refer to this value of 
m to estimate the mass of M-payment adopters at Step 2 and this value 
is used to assess the utility from M in equation (2). From that, we derive 
the marginal agents by solving u uC i M i, ,=  with respect to r . There are two 
potential roots ( r1 and r2) and one of which satisfies the condition r r r< < . 
Thus there is a unique equilibrium characterized by
r
k k t p w k k t k p w p k td l d l d l
1
1 1 2 12
=
+ − + − +√ + − + + + + − +( ( ))( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )a p w p w w
k k td l r
2 2 2 4 1
2 1 1
+ + − + +( )( )( )( )
+ − + +
∗≡
( ( ))
( ( ( ))( )) .
a
a   
This proves lemma 3.
Proof of proposition 1
Equilibrium values with M-payment are derived by replacing ∗r  into the 
M-payment adoption rate, the aggregate remittance levels, and the aggre-
gate surplus levels. The effects of t, p, kl and km are obtained by simple der-
ivation of optimal equilibrium values. That proves Proposition 1.
Proof of proposition 2
The equilibrium M-payment adoption rate m∗ amounts to n r rr r
−
−
∗( ) . The 
aggregate level of remittances sent to M-payment users amounts to 
R n r dwim w
w
i
∗ ∗= ∫  . The aggregate level of remittances sent to cash users 





. The aggregate remittances amount to 
R R Rc m
∗ ∗ ∗= + . The effect of parameters t, kd , and kl on Rc
∗, Rm
∗  and R Rc m
∗ ∗+  
can be deduced from comparative statics analysis on these three expres-
sions. That proves Proposition 2.
Proof of proposition 3
The aggregate level of the surplus of domestic users using M-payment 
amounts to DOS n u r drim r
r
i
∗ ∗= ∫ ( ) . The aggregate level of surplus of migrant 
agents associated with domestic agents using M-payment amounts to 
MiS n U r dwim w
w
i
∗ ∗= ∫ ( ) .
The aggregate surplus amounts to W DOS MiSm m m
∗ ∗ ∗= + . The effect of 
parameters t, kd , and kl on Rc
∗, Rm
∗  and R Rc m
∗ ∗+  can be deduced from 
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comparative statics analysis on these three expressions. This proves 
proposition 3.
M-Payment equilibrium/Benchmark comparison: 
proofs of propositions 4 and 5
Proof of proposition 4
In the equilibrium with M-payment, domestic agents using cash receive 
the same individual amounts of remittances (riB
∗ ) as those received in 
the benchmark equilibrium (see lemma 2). M-payment users receive an 
amount of individual remittance equal to rim
∗  as defined by lemma 3 rather 
than riB
∗  in the benchmark. As for all positive value of p, r rim iB
∗ ∗> , individ-
ual remittance levels increase with the introduction of M-payment for 
M-payment users. Thus, the aggregate level of the remittances received 
increases. That proves Proposition 4.
5.2.1. Proof of proposition 5
Because individual remittances are unchanged, the utility of the domestic 
agents using cash in the equilibrium with M-payments is unchanged com-
pared to the benchmark equilibrium. Domestic agents using M-payments 
at the M-payment equilibrium prefer this to using cash only, so their 
level of utility increases with the introduction of M-payments. Then, at 
the global level, aggregate utility is larger in the equilibrium with M pay-
ments compared to the benchmark equilibrium.
Now let us compare the utility of migrant agents in the benchmark and 
the M-payments equilibria. Those migrant agents that send remittances to 
cash users provide the same level of individual remittances and also have 
the same level of utility. Consider the case of domestic agents that send 
remittances to M-payment users. Given the optimal levels of individual 
remittances in the two cases, once M-payment is introduced, the domestic 
agent will continue to consider cash payment as the more suitable solution 
based on its own utility, and the migrant agent will provide remittances 
equal to ri B,
∗  and not ri M,
∗ . Consequently, the utility level of these agents 
remains unchanged, and the utility of the associated domestic agents 
does not decrease. When i continues to increase, the situations remains 
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the same until i∗∗ such that U u w r u w r
i M i i i m C i i i B∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
















i∗∗ and for values of i greater than i∗∗, the remittances sent by migrant 
agents increases to ri m,
∗  which increases the migrant agents’ level of util-
ity. As the net utility of corresponding domestic agents also increases, the 
utility of the migrant agents increases for all values of i from i∗∗. Then the 
aggregate utility of households also increases. That proves Proposition 5.
